Supreme Court of California
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Supreme Court of California
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Celine E. LERMAN,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Mikhael Y. LERMAN,

Defendant and Appellant

Supreme Court No. **S296681**

Appeal Ct. Dist 6th No. H053267
Super. Ct. No. 22FL000408

Date of Ct of Appeal Opinion: 4/17/2026
Trial Ct Judgment Entered: May 15, 2025

Petition for review of a Decision of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District
Hon Mary Greenwood PJ., Hon Cynthia Lie J., and Hon Frederik Chung J.

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[72] PETITION FOR REVIEW AND APPLICATION FOR STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT entered on May 15, 2025

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Appellant
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PREAMBLE

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In this petition for review, the Defendant and Appellant, seeks to **demonstrate the unconstitutionality of California's mandatory equal division of community property**, as set forth in **Family Code § 2550**. This will be done through the lens of a proposed legal framework: the **doctrine of the highest power and the second highest power**.

This doctrine, when applied to divorce proceedings, reveals a structural imbalance that arises when **both the power to dissolve the marriage (the highest power)** and the **power to determine the terms of asset division (the second highest power)** are granted to one party alone. In such cases, the other party is left without meaningful recourse or protection—**a result incompatible with the principles of equal rights, due process, and constitutional fairness**.

This petition respectfully asks the Supreme Court to examine whether the automatic, mechanical application of the equal split rule in the present case has resulted in a violation of these constitutional guarantees and to consider whether legislative or judicial clarification is necessary to prevent further injustices under § 2550.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

- U.S. Const., amend. XIII 14
- U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 12
- U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 12

STATUTES

- Fam. Code, § 2550 11

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

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1. Whether the **equal division mandate** of California Family Code § 2550, as applied in this case, violates the **constitutional principle of equal protection** by disregarding the parties' respective merits and contributions.
2. Whether awarding both the **power of dissolution** and the **power to dictate the terms of property division** to the Plaintiff, results in an **unconstitutional imbalance of rights** between the parties.
3. Whether the mechanical application of equal property division, in disregard of individual merit, amounts to a form of **involuntary servitude** in violation of the **13th Amendment**.

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

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This petition presents a constitutional question of statewide importance that warrants review by this Court. The mandatory equal division of community property under California Family Code § 2550, as applied in this case, raises unresolved questions regarding equal protection and due process that affect every California spouse who did not initiate dissolution proceedings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment without addressing the constitutional dimensions of § 2550's application, and that court lacks authority to modify a statutory mandate. Only this Court can resolve whether the mechanical application of equal division — without regard to each party's actual contributions, the source of funds, or the structural imbalance of powers between the initiating and non-initiating spouse — satisfies the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This case presents three questions of first impression that have broad implications for California family law:

- Whether § 2550's mandatory equal division, as applied where one spouse both initiates dissolution and benefits from an equal split of assets acquired primarily through the other spouse's labor and separate funds, violates the Equal Protection Clause;
- Whether concentrating both the power of dissolution and the power to dictate the terms of asset division in a single party is constitutionally permissible under the Due Process Clause; and
- Whether the SINE Rule — under which the non-initiating spouse elects the method of asset division — provides a constitutionally sound and judicially administrable framework that this Court should adopt or commend to the Legislature.

The resolution of these questions will affect thousands of dissolution proceedings in California each year. Supreme Court review is necessary and appropriate.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

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The following are relevant dates of property acquisitions in relation to the dates of marriage and separation:

- **Rue Rachid Nakhle, Lebanon** – Acquired: April 6, 1988 (ref, p. 5, l. 13)
- **Marriage** – October 17, 1990 (ref)
- **Rue de Maubeuge, Paris, France** – Acquired: August 5, 1999 (ref, p. 6, l. 5)
- **Cherry Avenue, San Jose** – Acquired: July 19, 2001
- **Settle Avenue, San Jose** – Acquired: July 6, 2007
- **Booksin Avenue, San Jose** – Acquired: November 22, 2010
- **Rue Oberkampf, Paris, France** – Acquired: December 20, 2013 (ref, p. 18, l. 8)
- **Rue Courat, Paris, France** – Acquired: July 1, 2019 (ref, p. 3, l. 14)
- **Date of Separation** – February 6, 2023 (ref, p. 11, l. 5)

The property located at **Rue Rachid Nakhle, Lebanon** was acquired by me, the Defendant, two years prior to the marriage and is therefore the Defendant's **separate property**. The remaining six properties were acquired during the marriage and are properly that must be characterized as **community property** of the parties.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

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I, Mikhael Lerman, am the Defendant and Appellant in this matter.

I was born into a prominent Jewish family in Lebanon. My family, both on my father's side (Lerman) and my mother's side (Tawil), possessed significant financial resources. My maternal grandfather, Itzhak Tawil, was a banking partner of Jacob Safra, father of the internationally renowned banker Edmond Safra, founder of Republic National Bank of New York. Although my grandfather passed away in 1937, his professional legacy continued through his children, who were integrated into the Safra banking enterprise.

I had the privilege of working for a time at Republic National Bank of New York. My family's wealth included a real estate complex consisting of 16 residential units located in Lebanon, specifically known as the **Rachid Nakhle property**, which remains in family ownership to this day.

When I was 24 years old, my father passed away in April 1988. At that time, I inherited substantial cash assets as well as full ownership of the Rachid Nakhle property. I was unmarried at the time and a student at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. Since that inheritance, the rental income from the Rachid Nakhle property provided me with ongoing financial support until 2020, when the Lebanese economic collapse—marked by currency devaluation and a banking crisis—resulted in the cessation of rental income.

The Rachid Nakhle property, acquired by inheritance and well before the marriage in 1990, is my **separate property**. This fact is central to the present appeal, as the trial court's ruling included that "separate income" among others in a division of community assets that I believe is both unconstitutional and inconsistent with California Family Code § 2550.

Two years after the death of my father and the inheritance I received, I married my now ex-wife, Celine Lerman. Our marriage was formally dissolved on April 3, 2025.

During our marriage, we acquired six properties that are part of the community estate. My ex-wife came from a middle-class family with sufficient means to maintain a comfortable lifestyle.

Shortly after our marriage, we lived in a rented apartment on Rue Louis Blanc in Paris. A few months later, my ex-wife's family provided us with a larger apartment on Rue Oberkampf. At that time, my ex-wife was pursuing her Master's degree at the Sorbonne, and I was employed by a company named Normerel.

The Rue Oberkampf apartment was not initially habitable; it lacked a bathroom and had only a shower in the kitchen. Using the savings I had inherited from my father, I personally financed the remodeling of the apartment to make it livable. This property became our first jointly occupied residence. While the acquisition came through my ex-wife's family, the financial investment and improvements were made using my separate funds. It was in this home that our daughter, Avigael, was born.

I pursued a successful career as a computer engineer, with a pivotal opportunity arising when I joined STMicroelectronics. This position enabled me to emigrate to the United States with my then-wife, Celine, and our two children, Avigael and Joachim.

During this period, I earned a comfortable income, which was supplemented by rental income from my separate property in Lebanon (Rachid Nakhle). These combined financial resources allowed me to acquire three residential properties in the Willow Glen neighborhood of San Jose in relatively quick succession.

My wife, Celine, did not contribute financially toward the purchase of these three properties. The acquisitions were made entirely through my earnings and separate assets and should be recognized accordingly.

Additionally, Celine's brother, Gerald, occupied our first jointly used apartment located on Rue Oberkampf in Paris, France, without paying rent. Despite my objections, Celine declined to request rent from him, and she did not contribute to any expenses related to the three Willow Glen properties.

Summary of Property Interests and Contributions

Of the six community properties acquired during the marriage, two—**Rue de Maubeuge** and **Rue Oberkampf**, both located in Paris—were provided by my ex-wife Celine's family. These properties should be recognized as primarily **attributable to her merit** and family support.

In contrast, the three properties located in **Willow Glen, San Jose**—**Booksin Avenue**, **Cherry Avenue**, and **Settle Avenue**—were acquired solely through my income and financial contributions, both from my professional employment and the separate rental income I received from the Rachid Nakhle property in Lebanon. These properties are therefore of **my merit** and should be treated accordingly in any equitable division.

We also jointly acquired a sixth property during the marriage: **Rue Courat**, an apartment in Paris. This property was purchased using funds contributed by both parties. Based on documented financial records, **74%** of the purchase price was paid from my separate or earned income, and **26%** from Celine's contributions. The division of equity in this asset should reflect these proportional contributions.

It is important to note that the stream of rental income from the **Rachid Nakhle** property in Lebanon—my separate property—ceased in 2020, due to the economic collapse in Lebanon. This was **two years before** Celine initiated divorce proceedings in **February 2022**.

Observations on the Timing of Dissolution

In 2020, my separate income from the Rachid Nakhle property in Lebanon ceased due to the country's severe economic crisis. This marked a significant change in our financial landscape, as that income had supported our household for many years.

Following this change, and notably without any significant marital dispute at the time, my ex-wife Celine filed for divorce in **February 2022**. While I do not dispute her legal right to do so, the timing and circumstances suggest that the absence of future financial benefit may have influenced her decision to dissolve the marriage.

Given the **equal division of community property** under California law, the termination of my separate revenue stream removed a long-standing financial imbalance in the marriage, effectively making dissolution more advantageous to her interests from a purely economic standpoint.

Disproportionate Final Judgment and Concerns Over Equity

At the outset of the dissolution proceedings, I expected that the division of property would reflect the respective merits and contributions of each party. Specifically, I believed that my ex-wife would retain the properties primarily provided by her family—**Rue de Maubeuge** and **Rue Oberkampf**—while I would retain the three **Willow Glen properties**, which I acquired and financed through my sole efforts and income. The **Rue Courat** property, to which both parties contributed, would be divided in accordance with our respective contributions—**74% to me** and **26% to her**.

However, the **final judgment issued by the Superior Court awarded five out of the six community properties to my ex-wife**, leaving only one property to me. This outcome is not only deeply inequitable, but it also disregards the financial realities of our marriage and the principles of fairness embedded in California law.

While California is a community property state that typically requires equal division, rigid application of that standard—**without consideration of the actual source of funds or efforts**—can lead to unjust outcomes, as occurred here.

Additionally, I must note the challenges I faced as a **self-represented litigant**. The complexity of the process, combined with systemic barriers and what appeared at times to be **a degree of institutional bias** in favor of experienced legal practitioners, raises concerns about whether the process was truly impartial. While I make no direct accusations, I believe the court should be mindful of how **informal alliances or professional familiarity among legal actors** can affect outcomes, especially when one party lacks formal representation.

Scope of Review Requested

I respectfully request that the Supreme Court review the constitutionality of California's equal division of community property upon dissolution of marriage.

This case presents a critical question: whether the rigid **equal split rule** under California Family Code § 2550 is compatible with constitutional guarantees of **equal protection and due process**.

I intend to demonstrate that the mandatory equal division, without adequate consideration of the parties' actual contributions and circumstances, leads to inequitable outcomes that violate constitutional principles.

Moreover, I will argue that the equal division rule creates an **artificial incentive for divorce** by transforming marriage assets into a financial stake that encourages dissolution rather than preservation of the marital relationship.

This issue has broad implications for family law policy and the social fabric of California. The Court's guidance is necessary to ensure that asset division rules align with constitutional mandates and promote fairness rather than conflict.

ARGUMENT

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A: THE EQUAL SPLIT VS THE MERIT SPLIT

The fundamental issue in this case is the constitutionality of California's mandatory **equal division** of community property upon dissolution of marriage, codified in Family Code - FAM § 2550. There are essentially two mathematical methods to divide assets in divorce:

1. **Equal Split** — dividing assets 50/50 without regard to the parties' individual contributions or merits.
2. **Merit-Based Split** — allocating assets according to each party's respective financial contributions, efforts, and other equitable considerations.

Under the equal split approach, the parties' merits or contributions in acquiring the property are irrelevant; all community assets are divided equally. By contrast, a merit-based split evaluates the source of the asset, whether funds were separate or community, and the proportional contributions by each spouse.

The critical constitutional problem arises when these principles are applied **inconsistently** between parties. In this case, the Superior Court's ruling is fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional because it applies a strict equal division to properties acquired through my efforts and separate funds while applying a merit-based approach to properties linked to my ex-wife.

Specifically:

- Two properties in France (**Rue de Maubeuge** and **Rue Oberkampf**) are undisputedly of my ex-wife's merit and were awarded to her.
- Three properties in Willow Glen, California, were purchased solely through my earnings and separate income. These should be awarded to me in their entirety under a merit-based analysis.
- The Rue Courat property was acknowledged by both parties to have been purchased with contributions proportioned approximately **26% by my ex-wife** and **74% by me**. The court's final order, unfairly awarded this property to my ex-wife.

Applying the equal split rule selectively to my properties but not hers, violates the **constitutional guarantee of equal protection** under the law. It deprives me of property rights without due process and grants my ex-wife disproportionate benefits.

For these reasons, this petition and the request to stay the judgment is proper to preserve the status quo while this fundamental constitutional question is reviewed.

B: THE DOCTRINE OF THE HIGHEST POWER AND THE SECOND HIGHEST POWER DEMANDS EQUAL RIGHTS IN DIVORCE

The doctrine of the **highest power** and the **second highest power** governs relations between two parties of equal rights and ensures fairness in transactions involving transfer of ownership or rights.

To illustrate, consider the hypothetical sale of an object, *Olives*, between Seller Samantha and Buyer Bob:

- **Samantha, the Seller**, holds the **highest power**—the authority to transfer ownership of the olives to Bob.
- **Bob, the Buyer**, holds the **second highest power**—the authority to set conditions, such as price, which influence whether Samantha will transfer the olives.

If Samantha were to hold **both** the highest and second highest powers, she could unilaterally impose unfair conditions, violating the principle of equal rights between the parties.

Applying this doctrine to the **Lerman divorce**, we identify:

- The **highest power** as the power to dissolve the marriage and thus trigger division of property. This power was granted solely to my ex-wife (the Plaintiff).
- The **second highest power** as the power to determine the conditions under which the dissolution and property division occur (e.g., whether assets are split equally or by merit). This power must rest with me (the Defendant) to maintain equality.

However, the Superior Court's ruling granted **both the highest power (dissolution) and the second highest power (imposition of equal split without regard to merit)** exclusively to the Plaintiff. This means she controls **both** the decision to end the marriage and the rules of asset division, granting her more rights than me and violating the principle of equality.

Constitutional Violations

This unequal distribution of powers contravenes fundamental constitutional protections, including:

1. **Equal Protection Clause** of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
    - Guarantees "equal protection of the laws" to all persons (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1).
2. **Supremacy Clause** (Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution)
    - Establishes that federal constitutional provisions are the supreme law of the land, overriding conflicting state laws.
3. **Citizenship Clause** of the Fourteenth Amendment
    - Ensures all persons born or naturalized in the U.S. (including both parties) are entitled to equal protection.

Policy Considerations and Consequences

By granting both dissolution and terms-of-split powers to one party, California's equal split rule disregards merit and incentives, creating a **perverse incentive to divorce**, especially where the plaintiff's contributions are lesser. This rigid rule prevents courts from applying equitable discretion, leading to unjust outcomes.

Furthermore, this flawed system generates increased litigation and appeals stemming from forced equal splits regardless of merit, imposing unnecessary costs on the parties and the judicial system alike.

C: THE SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF MANDATORY EQUAL DIVISION

The mechanical application of California Family Code § 2550 produces outcomes that are not only inequitable in individual cases, but that also generate systemic consequences inconsistent with the goals of a fair and efficient family law system.

When asset division is entirely decoupled from contribution — as the equal split rule requires — dissolution proceedings become less about resolving genuine disputes and more about positioning parties to maximize their share of a fixed pool of assets. This dynamic structurally incentivizes the lower-contributing spouse to initiate dissolution at the moment most advantageous to their economic position, rather than at a time reflecting genuine irreconcilable differences. In the present case, the cessation of the Defendant's separate income stream from Lebanon in 2020 — which had supplemented the marital estate for decades — preceded the Plaintiff's filing for dissolution by approximately two years, a sequence of events consistent with economically motivated timing.

Moreover, a rule that produces outcomes widely perceived as disconnected from merit or fairness places pressure on courts and the legal system more broadly. Litigants who cannot afford counsel, like me, the Defendant in this matter, face compounded disadvantages when the substantive law does not permit a court to consider the equitable circumstances of a given case. The result is that self-represented parties are systematically less able to obtain outcomes that reflect their actual contributions, not because the facts do not support them, but because the statute forecloses the inquiry.

This Court has both the authority and the institutional responsibility to determine whether § 2550 as currently applied comports with constitutional requirements of fairness, and whether judicial or legislative clarification is needed to ensure that California's family law framework serves justice rather than producing arbitrary results.

D: THE EQUAL SPLIT RULE RESULTS IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

California's mandatory equal division of community property under **Family Code § 2550**, when applied without regard to the source of contributions, leads to outcomes that can amount to **involuntary servitude** in violation of the **13th Amendment to the United States Constitution**.

> "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime… shall exist within the United States."
> — *13th Amendment, U.S. Constitution*

From **1990 to 2025**, I labored diligently to build and acquire multiple properties through my own effort, career advancement, and personal savings—including income from my separate property in Lebanon. The final judgment awarded the vast majority of these properties to my ex-wife, despite her limited financial contribution toward them. This outcome effectively compelled me to **labor for 35 years for the financial benefit of another person**, without recognition of my individual merit or reimbursement for my separate contributions.

While I acknowledge the principle of community property and shared marital responsibility, the **complete disregard for merit or proportionality in the final judgment converts shared effort into forced transfer**. It denies me the fruit of my labor, rendering me a domestic provider without economic rights—**a condition akin to involuntary servitude** under constitutional standards of fairness and liberty.

The **equal division rule**, when applied in this rigid and one-sided manner, fails to provide a constitutional remedy or opportunity to recover the value of my labor and contributions. This is not consistent with **justice** or the intent of the **13th Amendment**.

E: THE SINE RULE (Spouse Initiates, Non-initiator Elects) RESOLVES THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE

To address the structural imbalance identified above, this submission advances the principle known as the SINE Rule: **Spouse Initiates, Non-initiator Elects**. Under this framework, the spouse who initiates dissolution exercises the highest power — the authority to terminate the marriage. The non-initiating spouse correspondingly holds the second highest power — the authority to elect the method of asset division — and may choose between (1) equal division of marital assets, or (2) merit-based, contribution-proportionate division of assets. This separation of powers ensures that no single party simultaneously controls both the decision to dissolve the marriage and the economic terms that follow from that decision. The initiating spouse retains full freedom to terminate the marriage; the non-initiating spouse retains agency over its financial consequences. The SINE Rule operates across different marital property regimes: in community property states such as California, it prevents windfall outcomes when the lower-contributing spouse initiates dissolution; in equitable distribution states, it prevents economic penalties when the higher-contributing spouse initiates. By decoupling termination authority from allocation authority, the doctrine eliminates structural incentives for strategic divorce initiation, and aligns marital dissolution law with the constitutional guarantee of equal rights at dissolution recognized under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applied to the present case, the SINE Rule would have entitled the Defendant — as the non-initiating spouse — to elect merit-based division, which would have produced an outcome consistent with both the parties' actual contributions and the constitutional principles of equal protection and due process discussed above.

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Supreme Court grant review and issue a stay of the trial court order of May 15, 2025.

The rigid application of **California Family Code § 2550**, mandating an equal division of community property without regard to individual contributions, violates constitutional principles of **equal protection**, **due process**, and, in effect, imposes **involuntary servitude** on me, the contributing party. This standard has led to an unjust and disproportionate distribution of assets in the present case.

Accordingly, the Court should:

1. **Clarify** that the choice between an **equal** or **merit-based** division of property—which constitutes the *second highest power*—must be given to the **Defendant**, where the **Plaintiff** has exercised the *highest power* of initiating dissolution. This balance is essential to preserve the principle of equal rights between the parties;
2. **Encourage legislative revision** of California Family Code § 2550 to adopt the SINE rule, promoting uniformity and objective fairness in marital property division.
3. **S**tay the order of May 15, 2025, in order to prevent irreparable harm.

Respectfully submitted,



Digitally signed by
Mikhael Lerman
Date: 2026.05.18
20:24:06 -07'00'

Mikhael Y. Lerman
Defendant and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

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I hereby certify that this petition for review contains 4402 words, including footnotes. In making this certification, I have relied on the word count of the computer program used to prepare the document. Executed under penalty of perjury at San Jose, California.



Digitally signed by
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-▲-

The following documents were served by mail on May 17, 2026, with postage fully prepaid, upon the persons listed below:

— [72]_Petition_to_supreme_court.pdf

Person served
— Celine E. Lerman (Respondent), through her counsel of record
Larry Peterson: 2021 The Alameda, Suite 160, San Jose, CA 95126
— Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara
191 North 1st Street, San Jose, CA 95113
— Court of Appeal, Sixth District: 333 W Santa Clara St #1060, San Jose, CA 95113

The mailing occurred from San Jose, California. A fully executed Proof of Service on Judicial Council Form APP-009, signed under penalty of perjury by Grace Trout on May 19, 2026, is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. (2 pages)

Follows attachment of 2 pages (Proof of service)

S296681

APP-009

PROOF OF SERVICE (Court of Appeal)

[x] **Mail** [ ] **Personal Service**

Notice: This form may be used to provide proof that a document has been served in a proceeding in the Court of Appeal. Please read *Information Sheet for Proof of Service (Court of Appeal)* (form APP-009-INFO) before completing this form. Do not use this form for proof of electronic service. See form APP-009E.

Case Name: DIVORCE LERMAN

Court of Appeal Case Number: H053267

Superior Court Case Number: 22FL000408

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and **not a party to this legal action.**
2. My [x] residence [ ] business address is *(specify)*:

   San Jose, CA
3. I mailed or personally delivered a copy of the following document as indicated below *(fill in the name of the document you mailed or delivered and complete either a or b):*

   — [72] Petition for review and application for stay of enforcement of judgment

   a. [x] **Mail.** I mailed a copy of the document identified above as follows:

      (1) I enclosed a copy of the document identified above in an envelope or envelopes **and**

      (a) [x] **deposited** the sealed envelope(s) with the U.S. Postal Service, with the postage fully prepaid.

      (b) [ ] **placed** the envelope(s) for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in items below, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice of collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the U.S. Postal Service, in a sealed envelope(s) with postage fully prepaid.

      (2) Date mailed: May 19, 2026

      (3) The envelope was or envelopes were addressed as follows:

      (a) Person served: — Celine E. Lerman (Respondent), through her counsel of record
      (i) Name: Larry Peterson: 2021 The Alameda, Suite 160, San Jose, CA 95126
      (ii) Address:

      (b) Person served: — Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara
      (i) Name: 191 North 1st Street, San Jose, CA 95113
      (ii) Address:

      (c) Person served: — Court of Appeal, Sixth District:
      (i) Name: 333 W Santa Clara St #1060, San Jose, CA 95113
      (ii) Address:

      (d)

      [ ] Additional persons served are listed on the attached page *(write "APP-009, Item 3a" at the top of the page).*

      (4) I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The document was mailed from (city and state): San Jose CA

Form Approved for Optional Use
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APP-009 [Rev. January 1, 2017]

Case Name: DIVORCE LERMAN	Court of Appeal Case Number: H053267
	Superior Court Case Number: 22FL000408

3. b. ☐ **Personal delivery.** I personally delivered a copy of the document identified above as follows:

(1) Person served:
(a) Name:
(b) Address where delivered:

(c) Date delivered:
(d) Time delivered:

(2) Person served:
(a) Name:
(b) Address where delivered:

(c) Date delivered:
(d) Time delivered:

(3) Person served:
(a) Name:
(b) Address where delivered:

(c) Date delivered:
(d) Time delivered:

☐ Names and addresses of additional persons served and delivery dates and times are listed on the attached page *(write "APP-009, Item 3b" at the top of the page)*.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: May 19, 2026

Grace Trout
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)

Grace Trout
(SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)